
























Research Unit for Statistical
and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)
Hi-Stat
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitatchi Tokyo, 186-8601 Japan
http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
May 2010
Partnership-Enhancement and Stability in
Matching Problems 
Koichi Tadenuma





Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan
Email: koichiɽt ˏ econɽhit-uɽacɽjp
April 2010
1Abstract
In two-sided matching problems, we consider “natural” changes in prefer-
ences of agents in which only the rankings of current partners are enhanced.
We introduce two desirable properties of matching rules under such rank-
enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who be-
comes higher ranked by the original partner should not be punished. We
show that this property cannot always be met if the matchings are required
to be stable. However, if only one agent changes his preferences, the above
requirement is compatible with stability, and moreover, envy-minimization
in stable matchings can also be attained. The other property is a solidarity
property, requiring that all of the “irrelevant” agents, whose preferences as
well as whose original partners’ preferences are unchanged, should be aﬀected
in the same way; either all weakly better oﬀ or all worse oﬀ. We show that
when matchings are required to be stable, this property does not always hold.
Keywords: two-sided matching problem, stable matching, partnership, soli-
darity.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C78, C71, D71, D63
21 Introduction
Consider a ﬁrm that has several factories. The ﬁrm must assign workers to
these factories. Each factory manager has preferences over the workers, while
each worker has preferences over which factory he works at. How should we
match the workers to the factory managers?
Allocation problems such as the above example are called two-sided
matching problems. They were ﬁrst studied by Gale and Shapley (1962),
who deﬁned a matching to be stable if (i) no matched agent would rather
be unmatched and (ii) there does not exist a pair of agents (one from each
group, in our example, a worker and a manager) who would both prefer to
be matched to each other than to whom they are matched. Stability is the
crucial requirement for a matching to be formulated and maintained by the
agents.
In this paper, we consider some “natural” changes of preferences of the
agents after some matching is formulated. In our factory example, workers
usually acquire factory-speciﬁc skills in the long-run, and thereby become
higher ranked in the preference orders of the managers they are currently
matched with. At the same time, workers also prefer working at their current
places of employment to working elsewhere after obtaining such skills. Thus,
it is natural to consider preference changes such that for each agent i, his
current partner in a matching chosen by the rule is preferred to more of his
potential partners after the preference change, holding the relative rankings of
the other possible partners ﬁxed. We call such a transformation of preferences
rank-enhancements of partners. This kind of transformations of preferences
was introduced by Tadenuma (2008).
We study how matchings should change with these “natural” changes of
preferences of the agents. For that purpose, we deﬁne a matching rule to be
a mapping that associates with each preference proﬁle a matching, and we
formulate the following two desirable properties of matching rules in relation
3to rank-enhancements of partners. One property is concerning the agents
whose ranks are enhanced in the preference orders of their initial partners,
and the other is concerning “irrelevant” agents.
First, notice that rank-enhancements of partners should be encouraged
in the ﬁrm because acquisition of factory-speciﬁc skills by the workers con-
tributes to higher productivity of labor. Thus, if some agent is ranked higher
in the preference order of his current partner, he should not be punished
at the new matching formulated after the preference change. He should be
matched to the same partner or to another agent whose rank is higher than
the current one in his own preference order. We call such a property No
Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Agents. This is an important property of
matching rules in order to provide a proper incentive for workers to acquire
factory-speciﬁc skills.
Second, we consider the solidarity principle, a fundamental principle in
normative economics. Generally, it requires that, when some data in the
problem (preferences, the amount of resources, and so on) change, all the
agents in the same situation with respect to the change should be aﬀected
in the same direction: They should all be better oﬀ or they should all be
worse oﬀ at the new allocation chosen by the rule. One form of this prin-
ciple is solidarity under preference changes: When the preferences of some
agents change, the agents whose preferences are ﬁxed should be aﬀected in
the same direction. This version of the solidarity principle was ﬁrst stud-
ied by Moulin (1987) in the context of quasi-linear binary social choice.1
In our context of rank-enhancements of partners, however, there is another
1Thomson (1993,1997,1998) extensively analyzed this property in classes of resource
allocations problems with single-peaked preferences and with indivisible goods. Sprumont
(1996) considered a class of general choice problems and formulated a solidarity property
that applies when the feasibility constraints and the preferences can change simultaneously.
All of these authors have considered arbitrary changes of preferences, and hence their
versions are more demanding than the version studied in this paper which applies only to
some speciﬁc kind of preference changes.
4element that distinguishes the agents whose own preferences are unchanged
into two types: one is the group of agents whose ranks become strictly higher
in the preference orders of their current partners, and the other is the rest
of the agents. As we have discussed above, the agents in the former group
should not lose in the new matching after the change in preference proﬁles.
On the other hand, the agents in the latter group are “irrelevant” agents
in the sense that neither their own preferences nor their current partners’
preferences change. They may gain or lose in the new matching, but there is
no reason to discriminate between the agents in the same group. Thus, we
require that all these “irrelevant” agents should be aﬀected in the same direc-
tion under rank-enhancements of partners. This property is called Solidarity
under Rank-Enhancements of Partners.
We examine the existence of matching rules that always select from the
set of stable matchings and that satisfy No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced
Agents or Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners. Unfortunately,
neither of the two properties cannot be met with the requirement of Stability.
Then, we consider a further restricted class of preference changes: only
one agent increases the rank of his original partner. We call such a change in
preferences a single rank-enhancement of partner, and deﬁne weaker proper-
ties which apply only to this more restricted class of preference changes. It is
shown that there exists a selection rule from stable matchings that satisﬁes
No Punishment for Single Rank-Enhanced Agent. Moreover, any rule that
selects from envy-minimizing stable matchings satisﬁes this property.
Turning to the solidarity property, however, we show that Solidarity un-
der Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner is still incompatible with Stability.
Tadenuma (2008) considered a somewhat stronger version of Solidarity under
Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner than the current one, and showed that
there exists no selection rule from envy-minimizing stable matchings that sat-
isﬁes the stronger version of Solidarity. The present paper strengthens this
result by showing that even without any conditions on equity of matchings,
5Stability and the weaker version of Solidarity are incompatible.
Our properties are logically related with Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin,
1999), which is a necessary condition for a social choice correspondence to be
implementable in Nash equilibria. It can be checked that in the present con-
text of two-sided matchings, Maskin Monotonicity implies both No Punish-
ment for Rank-Enhanced Agents and Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements
of Partners, but the converse does not hold. Hence, as a corollary of our
impossibility results, we can show that no (single-valued) selection rule from
stable matchings is Maskin monotonic even on the domain of “pure” match-
ing problems in which being unmatched (or unemployed) is the worst situ-
ation for every agent (Tadenuma and Toda, 1998). It should be noted that
the proof of Tadenuma and Toda (1998) cannot be adapted for the theorems
in the present paper because it uses transformations of preferences that are
not rank-enhancements of partners. Kara and S¨ onmez (1996) showed that no
proper subcorrespondence of the stable matchings correspondence is Maskin
monotonic. But their proof relies crucially on the preference orders in which
being unmatched is not necessarily worst for the agents. In fact, there exist
proper (but not single-valued) subcorrespondences of the stable matchings
correspondence that are Maskin monotonic on the domain of “pure” match-
ing problems (Tadenuma and Toda, 1998).
Kojima and Manea (2009) introduced two properties related to Maskin
Monotonicity, which they called Weak Maskin Monotonicity and Individually
Rational (IR) Monotonicity, respectively, in the problems of assigning indi-
visible objects to agents. Because both No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced
Agents and Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners are even weaker
than these two properties, we obtain as corollaries of our theorems that no
selection rule from stable matchings is weakly Maskin monotonic, nor is IR
monotonic, in the two-sided matching problems. These results should be
contrasted with the results by Kojima and Manea (2009) for the objects as-
signment problems that characterized a class of selection rules from stable
6assignments satisfying Individually Rational Monotonicity and Weak Maskin
Monotonicity.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The next section
gives basic deﬁnitions and notation. Section 3 deﬁnes rank-enhancements
of partners and introduces main properties of matching rules. Section 4
presents the impossibility and possibility results on matching rules satisfying
No Punishment for Single Rank-Enhanced Agent with the requirement of
stability. Section 5 shows incompatibility of Solidarity under Single Rank-
Enhancement of Partner with requirement of stability. Section 6 clariﬁes the
relation of our property with Maskin Monotonicity and related properties.
The ﬁnal section contains some concluding remarks.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation
Let F = ff1,f2,...,fng and W = fw1,w2,...,wng be two ﬁxed disjoint
ﬁnite sets such that jFj = jWj = n. We call F the set of factory managers
and W the set of workers. For each i 2 F [ W, let Xi 2 fF,Wg be the set
with i / 2 Xi and Yi 2 fF,Wg the set with i 2 Yi. We call Xi the set of possible
partners for agent i. For each i 2 F [ W, a preference relation of agent i,
denoted by Ri, is a linear order on Xi[fig.2 An alternative j 2 Xi indicates
that agent i is matched to agent j in Xi and the alternative i that agent i
is not matched to any agent in Xi (i.e., he is “matched to himself”). Let Ri
be the set of all possible preference relations for agent i. Given Ri 2 Ri, we
deﬁne the relation Pi on Xi [fig as follows: For all x,x0 2 Xi [fig, xPix0 if
and only if xRix0 holds but x0Rix does not hold.3
To concisely express a preference relation Ri 2 Ri, we represent it, as in
Roth and Sotomayor (1990), by an ordered list of the members of Xi [ fig.
2Note that we exclude indiﬀerence between any two distinct elements in Xi [ fig.
3Because Ri is a linear order, xPix0 if and only if xRix0 and x0 6= x.
7For example, the list
Rf2 = w3 w1 f2 w2 ...
indicates that manager f2 prefers being matched to worker w3 to being
matched to w1, and prefers being matched to w1 to being unmatched, and
so on.
A preference proﬁle is a list R = (Ri)i2F[W. Let R =
∏
i2F[W Ri be
the class of all preference proﬁles. We also consider the subclass of R of
preference proﬁles in which being unmatched is the worst situation for every
agent:
R
¤ = fR 2 R j 8i 2 F [ W,8x 2 Xi,xi Pi ig.
A matching µ is a one-to-one function from F [ W onto itself such that
for all i 2 F [ W, µ2(i) = i and if µ(i) / 2 Xi, then µ(i) = i. Let M be the
set of all matchings.
Following Roth and Sotomayor (1990), we represent a matching as a list
of matched pairs. For example, the matching
µ =
{
f1 f2 f3 (w2)
w3 w1 (f3) w2
has two matched pairs (f1,w3) and (f2,w1) with f3 and w2 unmatched (i.e.,
self matched).
Let R 2 R be given. A matching µ 2 M is individually rational for
R if for all i 2 F [ W, µ(i)Rii. It is Pareto eﬃcient for R if there is no
µ0 2 M such that for all i 2 F [ W, µ0(i)Riµ(i) and for some i 2 F [ W,
µ0(i)Piµ(i). It is stable for R if it is individually rational for R and there
is no pair (f,w) 2 F £ W such that wPfµ(f) and fPwµ(w). Clearly, if a
matching is stable, it is Pareto eﬃcient, but the converse does not hold. Let
S(R) denote the set of stable matchings for R.
Given a class of preference proﬁles R0 µ R, A matching rule (or simply
a rule) on R0 denoted by ϕ, is a function from R0 to M. If ϕ(R) = µ, we
8write ϕi(R) = µ(i) for each i 2 F [ W. Given a correspondence Ψ from
R0 to M, we say that a rule ϕ is a selection rule from Ψ if for all R 2 R0,
ϕ(R) 2 Ψ(R).
Let R 2 R and a matching µ 2 M be given. For each agent i 2 F [ W,
deﬁne
ei(µ,Ri) = #fj 2 Xi j j = µ(k) for some k 2 Yi and j Pi µ(i)g.4
The nonnegative integer ei(µ,Ri) is the number of instances of envy that
agent i has in µ. Deﬁne e(µ,R) = (ei(µ,Ri))i2F[W 2 Z2n
+ .5 The vector
e(µ,R) is called the envy vector at µ for R. We call a complete and transitive
binary relation an order. An order %e deﬁned on Z2n
+ is said to be a social
envy order if it satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) strict monotonicity: for all x,y 2 Z2n
+ , if x ¸ y and x 6= y, then x Âe y.
(ii) order preservation under addition of a constant: for all x,y 2 Z2n
+ , if
x %e y, a 2 Z2n and x + a,y + a 2 Z2n
+ , then x + a %e y + a
The following are examples of social envy orders.
(a) The order by the weighted sum of instances of envy.
Let λ 2 (0,1]2n with
∑2n





(b) The lexicographic order.
Let θ: Z2n
+ ! Z2n
+ be a function that rearranges the coordinates of each vector
in Z2n
+ in nonincreasing order. Denote by ¸L the lexicographic order on Z2n
+ .6
Deﬁne x %e y if and only if θ(x) ¸L θ(y).
Reduction of envy as a criterion of equity was ﬁrst considered by Foley
(1967) and Kolm (1972). The social envy order by the sum of instances of
4Given a set A, we denote by #A the cardinality of A.
5We denote by Z+ the set of nonnegative integers.
6For all x,y 2 Z2n
+ , x >L y if and only if there is k 2 f1,...,2ng such that for all i < k,
xi = yi and xk > yk. For all x,y 2 Z2n
+ , x ¸L y if and only if x >L y or x = y.
9envy and the lexicographic social envy order were introduced and studied by
Feldman and Kirman (1974) and Suzumura (1983), respectively.
3 Rank-Enhancements of Partners
In this section, we formulate properties of matching rules for certain “natu-
ral” changes of preferences of the agents.
Let an agent i 2 F [ W, a preference relation Ri 2 Ri, and a matching
µ 2 M be given. Let Li(µ,Ri) = fj 2 Xi [ fig j µ(i)Rijg denote the lower
contour set of µ(i) for Ri. We say that a preference relation R0
i 2 Ri is
obtained from Ri by rank-enhancement of the partner in µ if and only if:
(i) if µ(i) = i, then R0
i = Ri, and
(ii) if µ(i) 6= i, then Li(µ,Ri) µ Li(µ,R0
i) and for all j,k 2 Xi [ fig with
j,k 6= µ(i), jR0
ik if and only if jRik. Let Q(Ri,µ) be the set of preference
relations that are obtained from Ri by rank-enhancement of the partner in
µ. Given R 2 R and µ 2 M, let Q(R,µ) = fR0 2 R j 8i 2 F [ W, R0
i 2
Q(Ri,µ)g.
With rank-enhancements of the partners in µ, only the current partners
in the matching µ can be preferred to more agents; the preferences over any
other agents are unchanged. See the Introduction for some motivation for
considering this kind of change in preferences.
Given R 2 R, µ 2 M, and R0 2 Q(R,µ), let K(R,R0) = fi 2 F [
W j Ri = R0
ig denote the set of agents whose preferences are the same in
R and R0. We classiﬁed the members in K(R,R0) into two types. Deﬁne
N1(R,R0,µ) = fi 2 K(R,R0) j R0
µ(i) 6= Rµ(i)g, and N2(R,R0,µ) = fi 2
K(R,R0) j R0
µ(i) = Rµ(i)g. Because R0 2 Q(R,µ), i 2 N1(R,R0,µ) implies
that Lµ(i)(µ,Rµ(i)) µ Lµ(i)(µ,R0
µ(i)) with Lµ(i)(µ,Rµ(i)) 6= Lµ(i)(µ,R0
µ(i)), that
is, agent i is ranked strictly higher in the new preference order of his original
partner µ(i) than initially. In contrast, if i 2 N2(R,R0,µ), then neither agent
i nor his partner in µ makes any changes in preferences, that is, agent i is
10“irrelevant” to the change in preference proﬁles from R to R0.
The following property of matching rules means that no agent in
N1(R,R0,ϕ(R)) should be worse-oﬀ in the matching at R0 than at R. In
the following deﬁnitions of properties of matching rules, we denote by R0
the domain of the rules.
No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Partners: For all R,R0 2 R0, if
R0 2 Q(R,ϕ(R)), then for all i 2 N1(R,R0,ϕ(R)), ϕi(R0)Ri ϕi(R).
The next property states solidarity among “irrelevant” agents in the
change in preference proﬁles.
Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners: For all R,R0 2 R0,
if R0 2 Q(R,ϕ(R)), then either ϕi(R0)Ri ϕi(R) for all i 2 N2(R,R0,ϕ(R)),
or ϕi(R)Ri ϕi(R0) for all i 2 N2(R,R0,ϕ(R)).
4 No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Part-
ners
In this section, we examine whether there exist rules that always select a
matching in the set of stable matchings and that satisfy No Punishment for
Rank-Enhanced Partners. Our ﬁrst result is an impossibility theorem when
n ¸ 5.
Theorem 1 Suppose n ¸ 5. No selection rule from S deﬁned on R¤ satisﬁes
No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Partners.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a selection rule ϕ from S
that satisﬁes No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Partners.
11Let R 2 R¤ be a preference proﬁle such that
Rf1 = w1 w2 w4 ...
Rf2 = w2 w4 w1 ...
Rf3 = w3 w1 ...
Rf4 = w4 ...
Rf5 = w5 ...
Rw1 = f2 f3 f1 ...
Rw2 = f1 f2 f5 ...
Rw3 = f3 ...
Rw4 = f4 f2 ...
Rw5 = f5 ...
and for all i ¸ 6, wi Pfi w for all w 2 [W n fwig] [ ffig and fi Pwi f for all
f 2 [F n ffig] [ fwig. Then, S(R) = fµ,µ0g where
µ =
{
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 ... fn






f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 ... fn
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 ... wn.
.
Because ϕ is a selection rule from S, either ϕ(R) = µ or ϕ(R) = µ0.
Deﬁne R0 2 R¤ as
R0
f1 = w1 w4 w2 ...
R0
f3 = w1 w3 ...
and
(i) for all wj,wk 2 Xf1 n fw1,w4,w2g, wj R0
f1 wk , wj Rf1 wk,
(ii) for all wj,wk 2 Xf1 n fw1,w3g, wj R0
f3 wk , wj Rf3 wk, and
(iii) for all i 2 [F n ff1,f3g] [ W, R0
i = Ri.
Then, it can be checked that S(R0) = fµg. Because ϕ is a selection rule from
S, we have ϕ(R0) = µ.
12Next, deﬁne R00 2 R¤ as
R00
w2 = f1 f5 f2 ...
R00
w4 = f2 f4 ...
and
(i) for all fj,fk 2 Xw2 n ff1,f5,f2g, fj R00
w2 fk , fj Rw2 fk,
(ii) for all fj,fk 2 Xw4 n ff2,f4g, fj R00
w4 fk , fj Rw4 fk, and
(iii) for all i 2 F [ [W n fw2,w4g], R00
i = Ri.
Then, S(R00) = fµ0g. Because ϕ is a selection rule from S, we have ϕ(R00) =
µ0.
Notice that R is obtained from R0 by rank-enhancements of partners
in ϕ(R0) = µ. Because w2 is ranked higher by f1 at R than at R0, No
Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Agents requires that he should not get worse
in the matching ϕ(R) than in ϕ(R0). Recall that either ϕ(R) = µ or ϕ(R) =
µ0. If we had ϕ(R) = µ0, then ϕw2(R0) = µ(w2) = f1 Pw2 f2 = µ0(w2) =
ϕw2(R), and w2 would be worse oﬀ in ϕ(R) than in ϕ(R0). Thus, we cannot
have ϕ(R) = µ0. Therefore, ϕ(R) = µ.
However, R is also obtained from R00 by rank-enhancements of partners in
ϕ(R00) = µ0. Since f2 is ranked higher by w2 at R than at R00, No Punishment
for Rank-Enhanced Agents requires that he should not get worse in ϕ(R) than
in ϕ(R00). Then, by the same argument as above, it follows that ϕ(R) = µ0.
Thus, we have µ = µ0, which is a contradiction.
It is clear that the above result holds on the domain R as well.
Faced with this impossibility, we consider weakening the requirement. A
weaker version of the above property is obtained if we apply the requirement
only when one agent enhances the ranking of her original partner.
No Punishment for Single Rank-Enhanced Partner: For all R,R0 2
R0, if R0 2 Q(R,ϕ(R)) and N1(R,R0,ϕ(R)) = fig for some i 2 F [W, then
ϕi(R0) Ri ϕi(R).
13We now have the following possibility result. There exist selection rules
from S that satisfy No Punishment for Single Rank-Enhanced Partner. More-
over, it can be shown that any selection rule from the matchings that min-
imize social envy in the set of stable matchings satisﬁes the property on
the domain R¤ of preference proﬁles in which being unmatched is the worst
situation for every agent.
Given a social envy order %e, deﬁne
S%e(R) = fµ 2 S(R) j 8µ
0 2 S(R),µ
0 %e µg.
The set S%e(R) is the set of matchings that minimizes social envy according
to %e in the set of stable matchings for R.
Theorem 2 Let %e be a social envy order. Any selection rule from S%e
deﬁned on R¤ satisﬁes No Punishment for Single Rank-Enhanced Partner.
Proof. Let ϕ be a selection rule from S%e. Let R 2 R¤ and ϕ(R) = µ. Let
i 2 F [ W, R0
i 2 Q(Ri,µ) with R0
i 6= Ri, R0 = (R0
i,R¡i), and ϕ(R0) = µ0.
Note that R0 2 R¤. Let j 2 F [ W be such that j = µ(i). Because R 2 R¤
and µ 2 S(R), j 6= i.
We now claim that for all µ00 2 S(R), (i) e(µ00,R0) %e e(µ,R0), and (ii)
e(µ00,R0) »e e(µ,R0) only if µ00(i) = µ(i).
To prove this claim, let µ00 2 S(R). Since µ 2 S%e(R),
e(µ
00,R)) %e e(µ,R). (1)
For all k 2 F [ W with k 6= i, R0







k) ¡ ek(µ,Rk). (2)







i) ¡ ei(µ,Ri). (3)





00,R)] %e e(µ,R) + [e(µ,R











00,Ri) ¸ 0 > ei(µ,R
0
i) ¡ ei(µ,Ri). (6)









By (2) and (6), we have e(µ00,R0) ¡ e(µ00,R) ¸ e(µ,R0) ¡ e(µ,R) and
e(µ00,R0) ¡ e(µ00,R) 6= e(µ,R0) ¡ e(µ,R). Hence, by the strict monotonic-




00,R)] Âe e(µ,R) + [e(µ,R
0) ¡ e(µ,R)]. (8)





00,R)] Âe e(µ,R) + [e(µ,R






Thus, the claim has been proven.
Recall µ0 = ϕ(R0) 2 S%e(R0). By the above claim, either [µ0 2 S(R) and
µ0(i) = µ(i)] or µ0 / 2 S(R). If µ0(i) = µ(i), then obviously, i = µ0(j)Rj µ(j) =
i. Suppose that µ0 / 2 S(R). Then, there exists a pair (f,w) 2 F £ W such
that w Pf µ0(f) and f Pw µ0(w). However, since µ0 2 S(R0), µ0(f) R0
f w or
µ0(w) R0
w f must hold. But between the preference proﬁles R and R0, only
agent i has diﬀerent preference relations. Hence, either i = f or i = w.
By the deﬁnition of rank-enhancement of partner, for all x 2 Xi, if there
is y 2 Xi such that y Pi x and yet x R0
i y, then x = µ(i). Thus, we have
µ0(i) = µ(i). It follows that µ0(j) = µ(j), and hence µ0(j) Rj µ(j), which
completes the proof.
155 Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of
Partners
This section turns to the solidarity property. Unfortunately, whenever n ¸ 4,
no selection rule from stable matchings satisﬁes even the following weaker
version of Solidarity, which applies only to the case when one agent enhances
the rank of his original partner.
Solidarity under Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner: For all
R,R0 2 R0, if R0 2 Q(R,ϕ(R)) and N1(R,R0,ϕ(R)) = fig for some
i 2 F [ W, then either ϕk(R0) Rk ϕk(R) for all k 2 N2(R,R0,ϕ(R)) or
ϕk(R) Rk ϕk(R0) for all k 2 N2(R,R0).
Theorem 3 Suppose n ¸ 4. No selection rule from S deﬁned on R¤ satisﬁes
Solidarity under Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a selection rule ϕ from S
that satisﬁes Solidarity under Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner.
Let R 2 R¤ be a preference proﬁle such that
Rf1 = w1 w2 ...
Rf2 = w2 w4 w1 ...
Rf3 = w3 w1 ...
Rf4 = w4 ...
Rw1 = f2 f3 f1 ...
Rw2 = f1 f2 ...
Rw3 = f3 ...
Rw4 = f4 f2 ...
and for all i ¸ 5, wi Pfi w for all w 2 [W n fwig] [ ffig and fi Pwi f for all
f 2 [F n ffig] [ fwig. Then, S(R) = fµ,µ0g where
µ =
{
f1 f2 f3 f4 ... fn






f1 f2 f3 f4 ... fn
w1 w2 w3 w4 ... wn.
.
Because ϕ is a selection rule from S, either ϕ(R) = µ or ϕ(R) = µ0.
Let R0 2 R¤ be such that
R0
f3 = w1 w3 ...
and
(i) for all wj,wk 2 Xf3 n fw1,w3g, wj R0
f3 wk , wj Rf3 wk, and
(ii) for all i 2 [F n ff3g] [ W, R0
i = Ri.
Then, it can be checked that S(R0) = fµg. Because ϕ is a selection rule from
S, we have ϕ(R0) = µ.
Next, let R00 2 R¤ be such that
R00
w4 = f2 f4 ...
and
(i) for all fj,fk 2 Xw4 n ff2,f4g, fj R00
w4 fk , fj Rw4 fk, and
(ii) for all i 2 F [ [W n fw4g], R00
i = Ri.
Then, S(R00) = fµ0g. Because ϕ is a selection rule from S, we have ϕ(R00) =
µ0.
Notice that R is obtained from R0 by single rank-enhancement of partner
in ϕ(R0) = µ (only f3 enhances the rank of w3 = µ(f3) = ϕf3(R0)), and
that f1,w1 2 N2(R0,R,µ). If we had ϕ(R) = µ0, then f1 would be better oﬀ
whereas w1 would be worse oﬀ in ϕ(R) than in ϕ(R0), which means that ϕ
violates Solidarity under Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner. Hence, we
must have ϕ(R) = µ.
Notice that R is also obtained from R00 by single rank-enhancement of
partner in ϕ(R00) = µ0 (only w4 enhances the rank of f4 = µ0(w4) = ϕw4(R00)),
and that f1,w1 2 N2(R00,R,µ0). Because ϕ(R) = µ, w1 is better oﬀ whereas
f1 is worse oﬀ in ϕ(R) than in ϕ(R00). This means that ϕ violates Solidarity
under Single Rank-Enhancement of Partner, which is a contradiction.
17Clearly, the above result also holds on the domain R.
If we impose a weaker condition than Stability as a basic requirement
for matchings, does there exist a rule satisfying the solidarity property?
Tadenuma (2008) showed that there exist selection rules from individually
rational and Pareto eﬃcient matchings that satisﬁes Solidarity under Rank-
Enhancements of Partners.
6 Relations with Maskin Monotonicity
This section clariﬁes relations of our properties with Maskin Monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999), which is a necessary condition for a social choice correspon-
dence to be implementable in Nash equilibria. In the present context, Maskin
Monotonicity is deﬁned as follows.
Maskin Monotonicity: For all R,R0 2 R0, if Li(ϕ(R),Ri) µ Li(ϕ(R),R0
i)
for all i 2 F [ W, then ϕ(R0) = ϕ(R).
Notice that Rank-Enhancements of Partners are special cases of the trans-
formations of preference proﬁles to which Maskin Monotonicity applies, and
Monotonicity requires that an alternative chosen initially should also be cho-
sen after the transformation of preference proﬁles. Therefore, if a matching
rule is Maskin monotonic, then it satisﬁes both No Punishment for Rank-
Enhanced Agents and Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners, but
the converse does not hold. That is, both of our properties are weaker than
Maskin Monotonicity. Hence, as a corollary of Theorems 1 and 3, we obtain
the result that no selection rule from stable matchings is Maskin monotonic.
This holds also on the domain of “pure” matching problems in which being
unmatched is the worst situation for every agent.
Corollary 1 [Tadenuma and Toda, 1998] Suppose n ¸ 3. No selection rule
from S deﬁned on R¤ satisﬁes Maskin Monotonicity.
18Kojima and Manea (2009) introduced two properties of allocation rules
which are related to Maskin Monotonicity in the problem of assigning indi-
visible objects to agents. In the present model of two-sided matchings, these
properties may be adapted as follows. First, we deﬁne for each i 2 F [ W,
each Ri 2 Ri, and each µ 2 M, Hi(µ,Ri) = fj 2 Xi [ fig j j Pi µ(i)g and
Ii(Ri) = fj 2 Xi[fig j jPiig. The set Hi(µ,Ri) is the set of agents to whom
agent i prefers being matched to being matched to µ(i). The set Ii(Ri) is the
set of agents to whom agent i prefers being matched to being unmatched.
Individually Rational Monotonicity: For all R,R0 2 R0, if
Hi(ϕ(R),R0
i)\Ii(R0
i) µ Hi(ϕ(R),Ri) for all i 2 F [W, then ϕi(R0)R0
i ϕi(R)
for all i 2 F [ W.
Individually Rational Monotonicity is logically independent of Maskin
Monotonicity. Notice that if a preference relation R0
i 2 Ri is obtained from Ri






i) as well). And our prop-
erties require that with rank-enhancements of partners, agents whose pref-
erences are unchanged (R0
i = Ri) but who are ranked higher by their part-
ners should not be worse oﬀ (No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Partners),
or agents whose preferences as well as whose partners’ preferences are un-
changed should be aﬀected in the same way, all weakly better oﬀ or all weakly
worse oﬀ (Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners). Therefore, if
a matching rule satisﬁes Individually Rational Monotonicity, then it also
satisﬁes No Punishment for Rank-Enhanced Partners and Solidarity under
Rank-Enhancements of Partners. That is, both of our properties are weaker
than Individually Rational Monotonicity.
The second axiom of Kojima and Manea (2009) is the following.
Weak Maskin Monotonicity: For all R,R0 2 R0, if Hi(ϕ(R),R0
i) µ
Hi(ϕ(R),R0
i) for all i 2 F [ W, then ϕi(R0) R0
i ϕi(R) for all i 2 F [ W.
It is clear from the above argument that both No Punishment for Rank-
19Enhanced Partners and Solidarity under Rank-Enhancements of Partners are
even weaker than Weak Maskin Monotonicity.
Thus, as corollaries of our theorems, we obtain the following impossibility
results. Note that the results hold on the domain R as well.
Corollary 2 Suppose n ¸ 3. No selection rule from S deﬁned on R¤ satisﬁes
Individually Rational Monotonicity. No selection rule from S deﬁned on R¤
satisﬁes Weak Maskin Monotonicity.
The above result in two-sided matching problems should be contrasted
with the results by Kojima and Manea (2009) in objects assignment problems
that characterized a class of selection rules from stable assignments satisfying
Individually Rational Monotonicity and Weak Maskin Monotonicity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered “natural” changes in preferences of the
agents in matching problems; only the rankings of current partners are en-
hanced. We have introduced two desirable properties of matching rules under
rank-enhancements of partners. One property requires that an agent who be-
comes higher evaluated by the original partner should not be punished. We
have shown that when two or more agents enhance the rankings of the cur-
rent partners, then the above property cannot always be met if the matchings
are also required to be stable. There are cases in which some agents become
higher ranked by the partners and yet they get worse oﬀ in the new match-
ing. However, if only one agent raises the ranking of the current partner, the
above requirement is compatible with stability and moreover with equity as
envy-minimization.
The other property under rank-enhancements of partners is the solidarity
property, requiring that all of the “irrelevant” agents, whose preferences as
well as whose partners’ preferences are unchanged, should be aﬀected in the
20same way; either all better oﬀ or all worse oﬀ. We have shown that when
matchings are required to be stable, this property does not always hold.
Some irrelevant agents may be better oﬀ while others may be worse oﬀ after
the preference change.
Our analysis has been conﬁned to the case of one-to-one matchings. How-
ever, our impossibility results straightforwardly extend to the more general
class of many-to-one matching problems if we do not impose any constraints
on the number of workers that each factory should accommodate because the
class of one-to-one matching problems is a subclass of this general class.
To consider other desirable properties of matching rules under some “nat-
ural” changes of the data and examine their compatibility with basic prop-
erties such as stability, individual rationality, and Pareto eﬃciency may be
an interesting topic for future research.
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